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THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY – AUSTRALIA 
WINE TRADE AGREEMENT. 
IMPACT OF NATIONAL PREFERENCES 
ON A CHANGE OF SCENE IN TRADE POLITICS
In January 1994, the European Community and Australia signed the Agreement on Trade in Wine. Considering 
the dramatic changes in the international wine market, this strategy of policy coordination is hardly surprising. 
In the late 80s and early 90s the dynamic and highly competitive newcomers from countries like Australia and 
the USA have broken the domination of European producers for the ¿  rst time. What is astonishing though is 
the fact that the arrangement was reached in the ¿  nal phase of the Uruguay Round negotiations, three months 
before the signing of the Marrakech Agreement that regulated the trade of agricultural products. But neither 
Brussels nor Canberra settled for this ¿  rst arrangement, and fourteen years later they signed another Wine 
Agreement. The article presents the results of analysis of the political debate and legal actions preceding the 
two Wine Agreements between the EC and Australia. The main focus is on the political and economic factors 
explaining the 1994 EC-Australia Agreement on Trade in Wine as well as the motivation for the update of this 
arrangement in 2008. The author argues that the agreement can be explained in terms of the interests of wine 
producers. The proposed explanation is based on Andrew Moravcsik’s theory of national preference formation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the year 2008 Australian wine exports to the European Union (EU) reached the 
value of $1,2 billion1, positioning the country on the ¿  rst place among the extra-EU wine 
suppliers. Every fourth bottle of wine drunk in the 27 Member States that did not originate 
from the European Community (EC) itself came from Australia. Still, before reaching such 
a success, Australia put a lot of effort to ¿  rst guarantee its producers access to this huge 
but highly protected market. Leading the Cairns Group during the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions, Canberra pursued bringing the agricultural sector under the regime of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This happened in April 1994 in Marrakech, but 
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1  European Union Brief: Australia’s Relations with the European Union, of¿  cial website of the Australian Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/european_union/eu_brief.html [21.12.2010].
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in January 1994 the EC௘2 and Australia negotiated a bilateral agreement concerning trade 
in wine. Both contracting parties signed a second agreement in 2008௘3. 
The purpose of this article is to present an answer to the question: Which political 
and economical circumstances pushed the EC and Australia to seek a bilateral agreement 
on trade in wine? It is also necessary to solve a strictly correlated issue: In what way was 
the 1994 Agreement not satisfactory to the contracting parties so that they replaced it with the 
2008 Agreement? 
The hypothesis of the author is that the 1994 EC-Australia Wine Agreement is a result 
of unsatisfactory protection of the EC and Australian interests in the wine trade provided 
by the Uruguay Round agreements. The interests of both contracting parties, reÀ  ected in 
the national preferences and strongly inÀ  uenced by changes in the international wine mar-
ket, were not safeguarded at the multinational level. So, the parties decided in favour of 
a bilateral solution. The 2008 Wine Agreement, as a revision of the previous one, became 
necessary because of the changed political and economic circumstances – the three subse-
quent EU-enlargements and further export successes of Australia in the international wine 
market – as well as the matters not resolved in the ¿  rst arrangement.
First, the methods and the theoretical approach are presented in the article. Further, the 
most important tendencies about the international wine market are depicted. This way the 
short economic background for the two Wine Agreements is provided. This is followed by 
the political background – trade policies of the EC and Australia – as well as a description 
of the relevant actors. The preferences of both contracting parties and the important interac-
tions between them are illustrated, and at the very end the relevant results are summarized 
and conclusions drawn. 
2.  METHODS AND THEORETICAL APPROACH
The study was conducted as an analysis of the political debate and legal actions preced-
ing the two Wine Agreements between the EC and Australia. It was a disciplined interpreta-
tive case study (Odell 2001) aiming at explaining both arrangements by embedding them in 
the theoretical framework provided by Andrew Moravcsik’s theory of national preference 
formation. This theory, which is a part of broader rationalist framework of international 
cooperation in Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, usually relates to the process 
of European integration. But here it is applied to a new event: bilateral agreements about 
a speci¿  c issue. It is not about testing the theory but explaining a relevant event, since 
the 1994 EC-Australia Wine Agreement became the ¿  rst of a series of direct agreements 
between the EC and important wine exporters around the world௘4 (Foster, Spencer 2002). 
2  It is the European Community, not the European Union, which has a legal personality and can negotiate and 
sign international arrangements. Although the EC is a part of the EU, only the EC has the competence in 
international trade relations (Leal-Arcas, 2008).
3  This agreement came into force on 1st September 2010.
4  South Africa 2002, Canada 2004, USA 2005, Chile 2006 – EU bilateral agreements on trade in wine: http://
ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/wine/third/index_en.html [20.12.2010].
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The theory of national preference formation is grounded on an assumption of a liberal 
theory of international relations, according to which “states (or other political institutions) 
represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state of¿  cials 
de¿  ne state preferences and act purposively in world politics” (Moravcsik 1997: 518). Na-
tional preferences are de¿  ned as an “ordered and weighted set of values placed on future 
substantive outcomes, often termed states of the world, that might result from international 
political interaction” (Moravcsik 1998). The more a group can gain or lose, seen from the 
perspective of its single member, the more inÀ  uential it is likely to be. For this reason, 
producers’ preferences are generally considered more than preferences of taxpayers or con-
sumers (Olson 1998). Because of economic interdependence between states, governments 
are often not able to satisfy the national preferences by means of unilateral policies. There 
is a need of negotiations at the international level in order to reach policy coordination. But 
“international agreement requires that the interests of dominant domestic groups in differ-
ent countries converge; where they diverge, cooperation is precluded” (Moravcsik 1993). 
Further, the preferences’ character of the politically important groups strongly inÀ  uences 
the bargaining power of a government. The stronger its need to reach an agreement, which 
implies a bigger readiness to make concessions, the smaller its bargaining power.
By choosing this approach, the author decided to analyze the interrelation between 
markets and states as it had been described by Susan Strange. Interpreting a complex event 
based on human actions and relations, there is the need of involving aspects of social, po-
litical and economic nature (Strange 1984௘5, Strange 1994). 
The investigated period included the recent three decades, that is, the period since 
Australia has been present on the international wine market as a relevant exporter. The 
¿  rst step – the market analysis – was conducted on the basis of data from the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO), World Trade Organisation (WTO), the EC and Australian 
government sources. Then the political framework and relevant actors including their in-
terests were identi¿  ed. The ¿  nal step of the analysis consisted in de¿  ning the preferences 
of and evaluating the interactions between the EC and Australia. 
3. INTERNATIONAL  WINE  MARKET
The international wine market and its phenomena seem to be quite an understudied 
area of research. It is a very speci¿  c and complex ¿  eld that may be all about one single 
product, but far from being a commodity. Yet, wine can be a highly pro¿  table business and 
the players of this industry have a good reason to compete, considering that the global wine 
market reached already in 2002 the value of US$ 90 billion (Bartlett 2003). Although con-
sumption of wine in the world is decreasing, the volume of wine traded globally increased 
in the year 2006 by 8% reaching almost 9 billion liters. Both the value of wine traded and 
the unit value of it increased, respectively by 10% and 2% (27th Australian Wine Report). 
5  Book edited by Strange, see her Preface and the chapter 9: What about International Relations?, also the 
chapter 1 by Roger Tooze: “Perspectives and Theory: a Consumers’ Guide” (ibid., pp. 1–22).
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The battle that À  ared up between the wine producing countries has been growing, along 
with – or for reason of – the transformation of the world wine market, from its traditional 
regional orientation it had few decades ago to the highly international exchange market that 
it is today. In this metaphoric battle some countries become better off than others. The win-
ners are to everybody’s astonishment the New World௘6 producers, which only a few years 
ago were ridiculed in their attempt to be a serious competitor for the traditional European 
producers. This process of a shift in the centre of gravity from the Old World to the New 
World producers as well as the increasing trade in wine accompanied by a declining con-
sumption have been the most serious factors shaping the international wine market during 
the last three decades.
There have been three tendencies observable on the international wine market during 
the past thirty years. First, the Old World dominance in the wine market has been broken. 
Production, once concentrated in Europe, has become polycentric – wine is grown on all 
continents on an economically relevant scale. Even if global wine production reached its 
peak in 1982 and the last decades, with slight variations from year to year, was generally 
decreasing, it was mostly due to the reduction of output in the Old World (France and Italy) 
and there are still some countries increasing their production. Falling consumption has led 
to oversupply in the international wine market in the last years. Between 1990 and 2004 
wine production in Australia increased by 1 billion liters (+230%), so did the supply in 
the USA, with 845 million liters more (+53%) and in Chile (+65%). The vineyard surface 
in the New World grew during this period from 539 thousand hectares to 796 thousand 
hectares (+44%) (Halliday 2007). 
Second, the consumption of wine in the world has been decreasing, but it happens due 
to the important wine producing countries in Europe and in South America, being tradition-
ally the biggest consumers. However, nowadays the markets with the highest potential are 
starting to be the ones that have a very high consumption rate and at the same time cannot 
cover their demand with domestic supply, consequently importing signi¿  cant quantities 
of product. Some of these countries almost do not produce any wine, like United Kingdom, 
Japan, Belgium, Netherlands or Russia; some of them do not produce enough or have con-
sumers expecting a bigger choice than the one offered by domestic producers, as in the case 
of the USA and Germany. Consumption in these countries has been growing. Therefore, 
although global consumption is falling, there are many countries drinking more and until 
recently – what was even more important – more expensive wines. What has really been 
decreasing is the consumption of low quality wines. In Europe for example a huge amount 
of cheap, low quality wine is produced, impossible to sell on the market and therefore 
distilled for pure alcohol. The premium ones still sell very well and the demand for them 
is constantly growing. 
Third, the volume and value of wine traded globally has been growing. Wine has 
become by value the third most important agricultural export product in the world, being 
6  In the literature about wine, the term New World often refers to all the countries that do not have a history 
of quality wine production; the most important ones are Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and the United States, but also Brazil or Uruguay. Consistently, the term “Old World” is reserved to 
the long time incumbents, mainly Europe (Italy, Spain and France).
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ahead of such commodities like soybeans, maize and beef. Wine exports in 2007 were 
worth US$ 28,4 billion, what corresponds to a double value of chicken meat or coffee 
exports. Thirty years ago wines from the New World were still hardly known not only in 
Europe, but also in the rest of the world: wine was still a quite rare and exclusive product 
and it was perceived as a typical European delicacy. But if only a choice between products 
is available, it will be welcomed by the consumer. This is valid especially when purchasing 
power is growing (Rangarayan 1984). These important changes to the world wine market 
have led to the intensi¿  cation of rivalry between the traditionally wine producing countries 
and the relative newcomers from the USA and the Southern Hemisphere, to the advantage 
of the consumers.
4.  THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND AUSTRALIA’S TRADE POLICIES 
AND RELEVANT ACTORS
Comparing both contracting parties of the two Wine Agreements, some substantial 
differences are observable. These differences concern the meaning of the parties in interna-
tional trade, their wine industries as well as their trade policies. The EU is the world biggest 
importer and exporter of agricultural products, accounting in 2009 by value for respectively 
43,9% (extra-EU: 11,8%) of total imports and 42,3% (extra-EU: 9,4%) of total exports 
worldwide௘7; only 0,4% of EU imports in agriculture originate from Australia (WTO 2010). 
The European Union is also the biggest market for Australian wines, with almost half a bil-
lion inhabitants and 16,38 trillion US$ of GDP. Australia has a population of 21 million and 
a GDP of almost 1 trillion US$; and is also not among the most important destinations or 
origins of EU exports and imports௘8. It is therefore undeniable the importance for Australia 
to maintain good economic relations with the EU, and the strongly unbalanced negotiating 
powers of the two parties.
The strength of Australia comes not from the size of its economy, but the advantages 
of its wine industry. Australia has a concentrated wine industry structure dominated by 
a few big companies, which are responsible for the majority of the country’s output. Its 
producers apply advanced production technologies and invest in further development. Also 
its investor-friendly stable political and economic climate supports the industry’s expansion 
through foreign capital inÀ  ows. Considering these factors, Australia has a competitive ad-
vantage in wine (Castaldi, Cholette and Hussain 2006). The country also enjoys a compara-
tive advantage in all industries connected directly to natural resources, including agriculture 
and more speci¿  cally also wine (Chatterjee 1996). Pro¿  ts from this comparative advantage 
started to be enjoyed by Australia in the late 1980s, which can be explained by its trade 
liberalization policy developed at that time. Sectors, which gain from trade, are the ones in 
which a nation already possesses or wins a comparative advantage. Analogically, for sectors 
7  The numbers are respectively 37,4% and 37,7% for overall trade (WTO, 2010).
8  WTO trade pro¿  les, data for the year 2009, available on: http://stat.wto.org/CountryPro¿  le/WSDBCountry 
PFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=AU,E27 [25.02.2011].
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in which a nation loses comparative advantages the consequences of trade are negative. 
And as a matter of fact Australian agriculture not only pro¿  ted from the trade liberalization 
policy of Robert Hawke’s Labor government, but it was the agricultural industries them-
selves that pushed Canberra to adapt a policy favoring their development through exports.
The strength of the Australian wine industry is an implication of the collaboration 
between the stakeholders which involves an active and well developed system of organi-
zations. They have built a clear hierarchy with national, state and regional levels. The na-
tional organizations are the Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation (ABWC), the Grape 
and Wine Research and Development Corporation (GWRDC), and the Australian Trade 
Commission (Austrade) on the government side; as well as the Winemakers’ Federation of 
Australia (WFA), the Wine Grape Growers Australia (WGGA), and the Australian Wine 
Research Institute (AWRI) on the industry side. The close cooperation of these actors made 
both the “Strategy 2025” and the “Directions 2025”௘9 possible and supported economy 
of scale, high investments in research and development, generic and regional brand promo-
tion, and jointly coordinated marketing strategies as well as the fostering of distribution 
channels. The weak and fragmented industry structure in the majority of European wine 
producing countries (particularly France, and Italy) has led, in turn, to weak competitors. 
With one voice the Australian wine industry managed to articulate its interests which, 
aggregated at the national level, became part of the national preferences referring to trade. 
Signi¿  cant was especially the role of the WFA engaged in policy-making as lobbyist and 
a consultative body. Worth underlining is the fact that wine is Australia’s 3rd most important 
agricultural export product after beef and wheat, accounting for 8,2% of total exports in 
agriculture and exceeding such important Australian products as wool (6,5%), milk and 
cream (3,4%) or sugar (2,4%)௘10. The importance of the sector has in this case a strong inÀ  u-
ence on setting priorities in interest consideration: a sector relevant to the entire economy, 
which derives pro¿  ts mainly from exports and clearly articulates its expectations toward 
the government, will ¿  nd its interest represented and reÀ  ected in the national preferences. 
In Europe wine represented in 2004 5,4%௘11 of the total agriculture production௘12, and 
by value it was among the EU’s most important agricultural exports to all of its main trad-
ing partners: the USA, Russia, Switzerland and Norway௘13. Also generally wine enjoyed 
9  “Strategy 2025” was a development strategy for the Australian wine industry, jointly created by the Winemak-
ers’ Federation of Australia and the Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation. The ¿  rst target was to raise the 
sales, especially the exports, by 300% by 2025, but it proved to be quite an effective plan since this goal was 
reached already in 2001. As the strategy became obsolete already a few years after its creation, a new program 
called “Directions 2025” was launched in 2007. This program should help to guarantee sustainable growth and 
to preserve the position in the global wine market gained through the Strategy. See also the of¿  cial website 
of the Winemakers’ Federation of Australia: http://www.wfa.org.au/direction_2025.aspx [20.12.2010].
10  Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, data available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/ 
trade/negotiations/trade_in_agriculture.html [14.11.2010].
11  In countries like France, Portugal, Austria, Italy, Luxembourg and Slovenia the share of wine in agriculture 
production reaches 10%.
12  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Towards a Sustainable 
European Wine Sector, COM (2006) 319 22 June 2006.
13 European Commission: Agriculture and Rural Development, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/ 
analysis/tradepol/graphs/ [10.10.2010]. 
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in the years 2006–2008 the status of the most valuable agriculture export product of the 
EU: worth €5,6 Mio., it exceeded dairy (€1,8 Mio.), milk and cream (€1,2 Mio.) and pork 
meat (€1,8 Mio.) altogether௘14. But its wine production, by contrast to the New World, is 
still based on individual farmers and small cooperatives. In consequence, a big part of the 
industry seems to be not enough open for innovations and dynamic for conquering new 
markets. Taking into account this fact, Andreas Dür’s thesis that the EU trade policy is 
a form of protection for its importers and their foreign market access (Dür 2007) does not 
apply to the issue of this article. The EU protectionist measures concerning the wine in-
dustry aim more at the protection of the local import-competing producers. Further, Dür 
argues that “under certain circumstances, EU exporters mobilize in response to discrimina-
tion abroad and push the EU to conclude trade agreements to protect their foreign market 
access” (Dür 2007: 834). In the case of the EU-Australian trade relations on wine, this 
statement applies, mutatis mutandis, to Australia, not the EU.
Although cooperation between wine producers in the EU is signi¿  cantly less developed 
than in Australia, they do not lack representation of their interests. Since producers are 
able to exert direct and instrumental pressure on politicians and in the agriculture sector 
they usually are remarkably mobilized (Moravcsik 1998), their interests – in comparison 
to the ones of consumers or taxpayers – were and still are overrepresented in the process 
of national preference formation in the EU Member States. Furthermore, agriculture is in 
Europe still not only an economically relevant but also a politically sensitive issue, when 
considering the number of people inÀ  uenced by any potential reform. Wine production is 
by value far more important than sugar beets or olive oil and comparable rather to wheat. 
Being very labor-intensive, it involved more than 2,2 million people in 2005 (full-time 
equivalent), which is tantamount to 22% of the EU agriculture workforce௘15. 
The process of preference formation in the European Union involves one level more than 
in the case of Australia. Whereas in Australia nationally de¿  ned preferences are represented 
by the federal government in international negotiations, in the EU there is the supranational 
level in between. The interests of the social groups are aggregated ¿  rst in the Member States 
and then brought to the EU-level, where a compromise between the preferences of different 
Member States has to be found. It is the European Commission which has competence in 
international negotiations. Its preferences are not national but supranational; the outcome of 
negotiations should satisfy interests in possibly all Member States concerned. However, the 
interest groups in the EU are able to lobby not only at the national level but through the um-
brella organizations at the European level, such as the European Confederation of Indepen-
dent Winegrowers (ECIW/CEVI)௘16 or the European Federation of Origin Wines (EFOW)௘17, 
they can inÀ  uence the decisions of the European Commission directly. Sonia Mazey and 
Jeremy Richardson write that in Brussels “lobbying is widely regarded as a perfectly respect-
able and even necessary part of the EC policy process” (Mazey and Richardson 1993: 191).
14  Ibid.
15  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Towards a Sustainable 
European Wine Sector, COM (2006) 319 ¿  nal, 22 June 2006, p. 14.
16  ECIW represents around 210 000 winegrowers in eight Member States: http://www.cevi-eciw.eu [25.02.2011].
17  EFOW represents winegrowers from ¿  ve Member States: http://www.efow.eu [25.02.2011].
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Yet, the reason for which the EC and Australia sought an agreement was the negative 
externalities imposed by both parties on each other’s wine industries. The wine industry 
of the European Union is protected by a mechanism of the Common Market Organiza-
tion for wine, being a part the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) – the biggest system 
of subsidies worldwide and an obstacle for the Australian export-oriented winegrowers. 
The thorn in the European producers’ side was, in turn, an abuse of geographical indi-
cations (GIs)௘18. They claimed that making use of the well-known European GIs by the 
non-EU producers leads to limited access to some markets for the original wines with GI 
as well as potentially decreasing consumer loyalty௘19. However, the issue of GI protection 
may also be considered as a solution to gaining the upper hand in the light of the negative 
development in the CAP (structural oversupply in low quality wine), subsequent back¿  red 
reforms of the Common Market Organization for wine and the low competitiveness of the 
local producers. These new negative externalities could not be tackled unilaterally by any 
of the parties, and there were no regulations applying to this problem. Even though the 
Lisbon Arrangement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International 
Registration was signed in 1958, only 26 states௘20 like France, Italy, Hungary, and Portugal 
are contracting parties to it but other big wine market players like the USA, Australia, 
Chile or Spain are absent. Similarly, the Agreement on Mutual Acceptance of Oenologi-
cal Practices from the year 2001, signed before the second EC-Australian agreement, 
remained an accord of the World Wine Trade Group௘21, which is composed of the New 
World wine producing countries, and does not include any European state. Hence, there 
were no regulations provided which could help the EC and Australian wine industries in 
the changed economic and political situation. The results of the Uruguay Round did not 
bring any signi¿  cant improvement either.
5.  DEFINING PREFERENCES AND EVALUATING INTERACTIONS
The new development on the British market itself – the amendment of British liquor 
licensing laws and the domination of retail wine sales in the UK by big chains like Tesco 
or Sainsbury’s – along with the devaluation of the Australian dollar in the 80s and the close 
cooperation of all industry actors in the newly founded WFA, strongly supported Austra-
18  In the Article 22 of the Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): 
“Geographical indications are, for the purposes of this Agreement, which identify a good as originating in 
the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other 
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin” (TRIPS, Article 22).
19  This can be true if the New World wineries, using some prestigious European term, produce wine of low 
quality, thereby negatively inÀ  uencing the image of the original European product; or if the GIs help the EU 
producers to gain some market niches, for example for traditional, old-fashioned in style wines with ‘history’ 
(proved or legendary) like EST! EST!! EST!!! di Monte¿  ascone, Lacryma Christi or Tokaji.
20  The full list of members is available on the of¿  cial website of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO): http://www.wipo.int/lisbon/en/members/ [28.02.2011].
21  The list of contracting parties is published by the US government on the website of the Consumer Goods 
Industries: http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ocg/oenological.html [28.02.2011].
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lia in its conquering of the UK market (Anderson 2001, Spawton 2006). A new boom in 
the Australian wine industry started and, in comparison to the earlier ones in the coun-
try’s history, this one was utterly market-driven. While its domestic consumption did not 
increase, the total vineyards area started to grow rapidly. The industry became in a short 
period of time completely export-oriented. Therefore, the foundation of the WFA special-
ized in government relations, international affairs as well as research and development, 
in the late 1980s was by no means accidental – it was the period of intensive advancement 
in the Australian wine industry and ¿  rst big pushes on the government, which was expected 
to guarantee access to some new export markets. The government itself shared the aims 
of the WFA as – considering the relevance of agriculture in the Australian economy – 
it attached great importance to improving the competitiveness of domestic producers as well 
as to achieving regulatory objectives and limiting its spending (Moravcsik 1998). 
By the late 1980s Australia experienced a dramatic change in its trade policy and 
became one of the most open economies in the world (Capling 2005). Liberalizing unilat-
erally its market, what is a universally recommended solution, the government started to 
pursue a new trade policy, according to which the multilateral system was the best option 
and highest priority for further economic development. Mere unilateral liberalization could 
not guarantee commercial advantages and export markets to the interested producer groups, 
thus foreign cooperation and multilateral liberalization were needed. Since the agriculture 
commodities exporting countries did not manage to inÀ  uence the protectionist policies 
of the USA and the EC neither during the Kennedy Round (1964–1967) nor the Tokyo 
Round (1973–1979), Australia proposed closer cooperation to pursue their agenda and as 
a result the Cairns Group was created (Capling 2005). The energy Australia invested in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations should be perceived through its national preferences, which 
character can be here explained by Moravcsik’s approximation: “the greater the exports and 
export opportunities and the more competitive are domestic export producers, the more in-
tense the pressure for trade liberalization” (Moravcsik 1998: 38). Countries from the Cairns 
Group, which were generally competitive exporters of agricultural goods and which eco-
nomic development was impeded by growing protectionism, tried to use the negotiations 
to change the situation, but as the bargaining power of each was low they decided to act 
collectively. The position of each of them on the international market was relatively weak, 
so their exposition of the negative externalities of the European policies was enormous. 
Their preference intensity or “asymmetrical interdependence” only lowered their bargain-
ing power vis-à-vis Europe, since they placed more value on reaching an agreement and 
were in consequence more willing to make concessions (Moravcsik 1998). Even supported 
in certain issues by the USA, they did not succeed in breaking the European pattern of mo-
derate policy reforms (Daugbjerg 1999), which implied modest and sluggish modi¿  cations 
of the situation on the global agriculture market, disadvantageous for the Cairns Group. 
In spite of the importance of the Uruguay Round and many changes which were 
initiated, the content and the potential ef¿  ciency of the agreements was not wholly sat-
isfying to any party. The inclusion of many provisions was not secured even in the last 
months of negotiations. With their raising production the Australian wine industry looked 
for new markets; apart from the UK it wanted to enter also other European markets and 
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so Canberra was advised to phase out traditionally European terms and develop its own 
appellation-style system (Hinchliffe 2007). The Australian government, after consultation 
with important industry actors, agreed to both conditions of the EC and so the agreement 
was signed. Both the Australian and the EC wine producers did not want to wait for the 
results of the GATT negotiations – in Australia because of its growing production and 
need for extending the export markets, in the European Community because of lack-
ing sureness, that the GATT Agreements would protect their interests suf¿  ciently. It is 
especially visible in the case of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, which failed to provide any law against unfair competition in the brand-
ing of wine products (Hinchliffe 2007). Besides, in the EC the so-called traditional ex-
pressions – which were not recognized as geographical indications by TRIPS – were used 
as a barrier against imports. For those reasons in January 1994 the EC negotiated with 
Australia a complementary bilateral agreement on trade in wine. From the point of view 
of the Australian wine industry, the harmonization of standards – which could be used as 
a potential non-tariff barrier – was a way of trade facilitation, and that was why labelling 
requirements or mutual recognition of wine-making practices were of big relevance for 
countries exporting to the EU and were among the key issues in all bilateral agreements 
related to the wine trade.
The relation between the interests of some societal groups and national preferences 
in the European Union is more complex than in the case of Australia. It is because of the 
three and not two levels involved in the process of the preference formation: societies, 
Member States and the EU. According to Moravcsik, important social groups still express 
their preferences on a national level (Moravcsik 1991), even if having an opportunity to 
lobby at the supranational level. Practically it means that between the wine producers with 
their needs, fears and interests and the EU-bodies, regulating the sector and representing 
its interests in international negotiations, there is a kind of intermediary: the national state. 
The EU aggregates the preferences of single Member States’ governments and tries to 
coordinate different interests before negotiating with third countries. Frequently, the small 
EU-states can be assuaged by side-payments, while only the biggest ones enjoy the power 
of effectively inÀ  uencing every signi¿  cant change (Moravcsik 1991). Hence, the formation 
of EU-preferences is possible only through the convergence of national preferences in the 
biggest Member States. 
The preferences of the Member State do not need to be depicted separately. It is more 
about two groups: “protectionists” and “free traders” (Deutsch 1999). The attitudes of these 
groups toward the wine market and its liberalization mostly correspond to their general ori-
entation in trade with agricultural products. For countries not producing wine determining 
is whether they consume considerable amounts of this beverage or not. Some EU countries 
do not have any clear position and vital interests concerning the wine market and they do 
not belong to the important traders of this product, so they are not mentioned. 
The “protectionists” are the countries, which produce wine on their own, whose wine 
share in agricultural production is generally high, and which are mostly also less competi-
tive than Australia and other New World producers. Among them can be rated Austria, 
Bulgaria, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain. Wine 
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share in agriculture surpasses in the majority of them the wheat’s share௘22. Shortly before 
the ¿  rst Wine Agreement also the share of agriculture in terms of total labour force of 
these among the named countries, which were at that time members of the Community, 
remained high: from 6,1% in France, through 17,8% in Portugal, to 25,3% in Greece 
(El-Agraa 1994). This fact implies the signi¿  cance of agriculture, and more speci¿  cally 
wine, in the economies of the “protectionists”. Since producers are able to exert direct and 
instrumental pressure on politicians, and in the agriculture sector they usually are remark-
ably mobilized (Moravcsik 1998), their interests – in comparison to the ones of consumers 
or taxpayers – were and still are overrepresented in the process of national preference 
formation in the EU Member States. The “protectionist” EU members are also the ones, 
which registered the highest number of geographical indications for food (Josling 2006). 
Their farmers pushed the national governments and the Community to reach the highest 
protection possible for GIs, and – as the protection guaranteed by TRIPS proved to be 
not satisfactory – they concentrated their efforts on reaching bilateral agreements, where 
the Commission tried to negotiate an arrangement serving in fact exactly the “protection-
ist” countries. Considering their low competitiveness, they attempted to apply geographi-
cal indications as a strategy to regain some lost markets. Member States from the north 
of Europe registered relatively few geographical indications in general and, as they do 
not produce wine, they had no interest in protecting the terms, since it limits supply 
and raises prices. 
The “free traders” are in turn countries which do not produce wine or produce consid-
erably less than the domestic consumption (also in the meaning of variety of the product), 
but import huge amounts to cover their high consumption. Ergo, they have a stake in low 
prices, and so they support freer access of non-EU countries to their markets. Among them 
count the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, and to some extend also 
Sweden, Finland, and Ireland. All of them import noticeably a great amount of wine from 
the New World. In the UK, Germany and also in the smaller European markets Australia 
has a strong position. Germany, as the third biggest world wine importer, is in this ¿  eld de-
cidedly a “free trader”, even if its wine industry is even less competitive than the French or 
Italian ones and if it commits sins in the dark, concerning other agricultural products, as it 
was called by Klaus Günter Deutsch (Deutsch 1999). For the UK, free trade is still a domi-
nant ideology and policy orientation, especially concerning its small but highly ef¿  cient 
agricultural producers and its Commonwealth relations (Moravcsik 1991, Moravcsik 1998, 
Deutsch 1999). The Dutch and the Danish positions are similar to the British one. The 
Swedish, Finnish and Irish openness can be explained by their status in the wine market: 
they are not producers, but important consumers, importing considerable amounts also 
from Australia. These countries’ preferences corresponded with the Australian ones and so 
they supported a better access for its wine into the EU market. 
Generally, the free trade orientation, in both industry and agriculture, was characteristic 
in EU-12 for Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark. All other Member States 
22 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Towards a Sustainable 
European Wine Sector, COM (2006) 319 22 June 2006, p. 14. 
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could be de¿  ned as protectionist. The interventionist orientation prevailed – the “protec-
tionists” presented a majority, however not a two-third majority of votes in the Council, and 
were able to control the liberalization process. Still, the “free traders” had some manoeu-
vring room, especially when supported by the Commission’s efforts and the pressures from 
the trade partners abroad (Deutsch 1999). Among the 15 new Member States after 1994 
there were also more countries interested in protecting their agriculture than the “open” 
ones, so the position of Brussels in the negations of the second Wine Agreement did not 
appreciably change.
Under these circumstances, negotiating bilateral agreements with the biggest wine ex-
porters, the EU tried to defend the interests of the producers from the “protectionist” Mem-
ber States and reach satisfactory compromises from each partner separately. Toward any of 
them (except the USA) it had overwhelming bargaining power and, already offering small 
concessions, it was able to establish its interests, as the EU-Australia Wine Agreements 
show. Allowing the trade partners to handle together, as in the case of the Cairns Group, 
which members are all important New World wine exporters except for the USA, it ran the 
risk of facing a much stronger opponent in negotiations. The wine producing members of 
the Cairns Group accounted in 1993, shortly before signing the EC-Australia Wine Agree-
ment and the Marrakech Declaration, for 5,4% of world wine exports by volume and 5,6% 
by value. The EU domination in this ¿  eld – even if still overwhelming – was endangered 
for the ¿  rst time in history as the New World producers showed a strong tendency to grow. 
Fourteen years later, in 2007 – before signing the second Agreement with Australia, the 
Cairns Group share in world wine exports amounted already to 29% and 23%, respectively. 
The Australian ability to bring together poor and rich countries, which at that time amount-
ed together to over one quarter of the world trade in agriculture, and create some kind of 
a third force during the negotiations was probably one of the most pregnant components 
of its bargaining power towards Europe. 
The size of the EU market as well as its volume of trade make the Community a highly 
attractive partner for any kind of trade agreements and at same time guarantee its position 
as a key player in every multilateral arrangement (Dür, Zimmermann 2007). In the late 
1980s the European Community had some kind of trade arrangement with almost every 
country in the world (Pomfret 1986), but wine was a product of enough importance to dedi-
cate it an additional attention. Australia’s small internal market is one of its most signi¿  cant 
weaknesses, as its development is dependent on international trade. In the case of wine this 
dependence is even more far-reaching as Australia is reliant upon its main market – the 
UK – to a much bigger extent than any other important wine exporting country (Foster,
Spencer 2002). 
It is worth of notice that also the EU has an important weakness – its wine imports 
grow faster than exports, even if the European Union is still a net wine exporter23. Yet, 
European wine consumption decreases 0,85% every year and the EU-27 structural sur-
plus is estimated at about 8,4% of its wine production; 15% of wine is removed annually 
23  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Towards a Sustainable 
European Wine Sector, COM (2006) 319 ¿  nal, 22 June 2006, p. 3.
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from the market through the interventional distillation24. The EU has also low custom 
duties on wine importations and, together with a growing competitiveness of the New 
World producers, it could soon lead to EU wine imports exceeding exports. This partially 
explains why during negotiations the push for protectionism in agriculture was so strong 
for Europe. Still, the negotiating powers of the two parties are strongly unbalanced, which 
makes undeniable the importance for Australia to maintain good economic relations with 
the EU. From this point of view the Wine Agreement from 1994 enabled Australia to 
access a highly valuable market. This is also why Canberra was ready for so many com-
promises and concessions.
6. RESULTS
The new insights of the study may be summarized in four points. Firstly, changes in 
the market positions of the relevant producing countries shift national preferences. New 
national objectives implicate the need of regulation adjusted to the changed political and 
economical environment. The growing competitiveness of the Australian producers fol-
lowed by their orientation towards the world market implicated the pressure of the sec-
toral interest groups like the Winemakers’ Federation of Australia on the government. So 
found the endangered interest of the European wine industry its reÀ  ection in the EC trade 
policy focused ¿  rst of all on protection. The new market positions inÀ  uence the bargaining 
powers of the parties, too. It was the Australian export success which provided this small 
economy with arguments in negotiations with the European giant. At the same time the 
more “interdependent” countries, like Australia, usually pro¿  t more from market liberal-
ization, thus they prefer policy coordination and tend to concede disproportionally more 
in order to reach it (Moravcsik, Vechudova 2003). The bargaining power of a country is 
dependent on the relative preference intensity of a government: the more intense the prefe-
rences for an agreement (vis-à-vis an alternative solution like a unilateral policy-making), 
the lower the bargaining power.
Secondly, the efforts of the state to satisfy the national preferences, and thus the domi-
nant interest groups, offer an explanation for changing the arena in trade politics from 
a multilateral to a bilateral one. States may switch arenas in order to reach optimal policy 
coordination. The failure in launching a new round of the WTO negotiations in Seattle 
and concerns over the outcomes of the Doha Round led in fact to a boom in bilateral and 
regional agreements. This responsiveness of the government to the interests of important 
societal groups can be derived from the essence of trade policy, that is, searching for a way 
to shape and affect the international system to an advantage of a country, or at least attempts 
to minimize its disadvantage (Capling 2005). Hence, the important interest groups lobby 
the government to push through their interests, giving this way direction to the country’s 
trade policy. The inÀ  uence of some interest groups on governments, which in result rep-
resent them more than others, can be explained by the fact, that such groups are able to 
24  Ibid., p. 4.
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offer to the incumbents substantial political contributions, valuable in future elections௘25 and 
otherwise (Grossman and Helpman 1994).
Thirdly, the ability of forming coalitions can positively affect the bargaining power 
of a weaker party, as the case of Australia and the Cairns Group or the special British-
Australian trade relationships show. Within the Cairns Group Canberra was able to reach 
goals never available to it as a single player. Without the Cairns Group the objectives of 
the Uruguay Round would be set and negotiated solely by the most powerful parties: the 
USA and the EC. For the bilateral EC-Australian negotiations, the role of British-Australian 
trade relations should not be underestimated. Even though the British imperial preference 
system had already belonged to the past, the established trade ties, especially if for political 
and security reasons, do not vanish into oblivion that fast (Strange 1994). To the contrary, 
the position of the EU has been often weakened by diverging interests and preferences of its 
Member States. The relation between interests of some societal groups and national prefer-
ences in the European Union is more complex than in the case of Australia. There are not 
two levels – society and state – involved, but three levels – societies, Member States and 
the EU. Although the European Union is treated by some authors as a single unitary actor 
of the international scene, it cannot be understood as entity comparable to national states. 
The Member States are sovereign and their national interests and preferences matter. In the 
EU preferences vary both by issues and by country and reÀ  ect the issue-speci¿  c interests 
of the powerful societal groups in each Member State (Moravcsik 1998).
Fourthly, the geographical indication issue is used by the EU as protectionist strategy 
for the bene¿  t of its local import-competing producers. Protectionism in the EU has never 
relied only on tariffs but has involved a range of other instruments like variable levies, 
antidumping measures or technical barriers. Through the successful enforcement of the 
European concept of geographical indications, Brussels tries to eliminate competition 
from a market for a certain commodity. Competitors have to defray high costs in order 
to reenter the market, if they manage to reach it at all. Considering this policy of the EU 
and the reappearing conÀ  icts between the EU and Australia over the CAP, both parties 
decided to sign an arrangement exclusively for wine. The more issues that would be 
included, the harder it would be to reach an agreement. It is particularly true for multi-
lateral agreements, where the states have multiple and frequently mutually inconsistent 
objectives (Strange 1994). 
7. SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
The late 1980s and the early 1990s brought changes not only related to the Uruguay 
Round. It was a time of dramatic transformations in the international wine market, too. The 
dominance of the Old World was broken and the signi¿  cance of the New World producers 
started to grow. While the Australian share in the international wine market was increas-
25  An example of a political contribution from which incumbent of¿  ceholders may pro¿  t in future elections are 
PAC’s – Political Action Committees, supporting them for instance through fundraising.
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ing, the European one was falling, continuously. The interests of wine producers crystal-
lized on both sides in the environment of changes in the international wine market and not 
satisfying negotiation outcomes in the Uruguay Round. While competitive wine industry 
players from Australia pushed for trade liberalization and sought for freer access to the 
European market, their substantially less competitive counterparts from Europe called for 
better protection. But these changes affected not only the economic interests and led the 
way to the de¿  ning of national preferences on this issue, they inÀ  uenced also Brussels and 
Canberra’s bargaining powers. 
A bilateral solution corresponded with the preferences of both contracting parties. Even 
if Australian and European producers had thoroughly conÀ  ictual interests, the Agreements 
reduced the negative externalities that the policies and economic strategies of both partners 
created for each other. In the EU there was also a compromise between the protectionist 
and liberal oriented Member States needed (Conceição 2010). Although the guaranteed 
protection of the geographical indications and traditional expressions pleased mostly the 
protectionist Member States, a greater access for imports from Australia was of advantage 
for national markets of the free traders. 
The EU’s gains in both Wine Agreements analyzed outweighed the Australian ones. 
Still, both parties reached objectives which were not guaranteed by the WTO. The EU 
achieved protection for all of its geographical indications and traditional expressions, in-
cluding the ones considered as generic terms. Australia provided its wine industry with 
better access to the European market and, having its oenological practices and labelling 
standards recognized, reduced the risk of the EU using these issues as non-tariff barriers. 
Canberra paid a high price for these concessions, mainly through costly rebranding and 
losing markets for some particular wines. The second Wine Agreement was in fact an 
update of the 1994 one, resolving issues still open in 1994 and adapting the provisions to 
the changed political and economic circumstances. But observing the stalled Doha Round 
negotiations, both contracting parties could feel reassured that the bilateral solution served 
their interests more. The ¿  ndings con¿  rm the hypothesis; the theory of national preference 
formation offers an explanation for the arrangements between the EC and Australia. 
The Uruguay Round negotiations present a relevant background for the 1994 EC-Australia 
Wine Agreement and their results – unsatisfactory to both Australia and the EC – are the main 
motive for signing the bilateral agreement. In fact, not only these two actors (and not only 
referring to wine) were concerned over possible failure or delays and potentially unsatisfying 
results of the Uruguay Round. Also other countries sought for a more secure solution for their 
interests in other forms of agreements. The prime examples are the 1989 Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement and the signed ¿  ve years later: NAFTA. The increase in bilateral and regional 
agreements, caused by the uncertain outcomes of a new round of negotiations launched in Doha, 
brought much over hundred of them noti¿  ed to the WTO (Folsom 2008, Leal-Arcas 2008). 
As the GATT/WTO has not managed until now to regulate international trade in a way satis-
factory to its members, bilateral agreements will probably remain a preferred solution. These 
arrangements allow also to be selective and open each country’s market only for countries or 
products which are of advantage and do not endanger domestic production. They are discrimi-
natory, but it is in fact their biggest advantage for contracting parties (Folsom 2008).
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UMOWA POMIĉDZY WSPÓLNOTĄ EUROPEJSKĄ I AUSTRALIĄ W SPRAWIE HANDLU WINEM. 
WPàYW PREFERENCJI NARODOWYCH NA ZMIANY W POLITYCE HANDLOWEJ 
W styczniu 1994 roku Wspólnota Europejska i Australia podpisaáy „UmowĊ w sprawie handlu winem”. Taka 
strategia koordynacji polityk nie jest zaskakująca, jeĪeli uwzglĊdniü dramatyczne zmiany na miĊdzynaro-
dowym rynku wina. W póĨnych latach 80. i wczesnych 90. ubiegáego wieku dynamiczni i konkurencyjni 
nowicjusze z paĔstw takich jak Australia czy Stany Zjednoczone przeáamali po raz pierwszy dominacjĊ produ-
centów europejskich. Zadziwia jednakĪe fakt, Īe porozumienie osiągniĊto w koĔcowej fazie negocjacji Rundy 
Urugwajskiej, na trzy miesiące przed podpisaniem umowy w Marrakeszu, regulującej handel produktami rolni-
czymi. Ani Bruksela, ani Canberra nie poprzestaáy na dwustronnej umowie i czternaĞcie lat póĨniej podpisano 
kolejne porozumienie. W artykule poddano analizie polityczne i prawne kroki poprzedzające obie umowy 
pomiĊdzy Wspólnotą Europejską i Australią. Autor koncentruje siĊ na czynnikach politycznych i gospodar-
czych, wyjaĞniających umowĊ w sprawie handlu winem z roku 1994 oraz motywy jej aktualizacji w roku 2008. 
Dowodzi teĪ, Īe umowy moĪna wyjaĞniü poprzez interesy producentów. Proponowane wyjaĞnienie oparto na 
teorii ksztaátowania siĊ preferencji narodowych, sformuáowanej przez Andrew Moravcsika. 
Sáowa kluczowe: umowa dwustronna, Unia Europejska, ksztaátowanie preferencji narodowych, polityka han-
dlowa, rynek wina 
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